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NOTES.
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS UNDER R. S. OF U. S., SEC. 724-
PRODUCTION BEFORE TRIAL-How FAR RIGHT IS DISCRETIONARY
WITH COURT-THE RIGHT TO CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE.-This sec-
tion of the revised statutes has frequently given rise to
judicial interpretation. But the question generally presented has
been whether production by virtue of this statute may be ordered
before the trial at law or only at the trial at law. The various Cir-
cuit Courts flatly disagree' at present on that question. Many of
these conflicting rulings are collected in Vol. 56 (0. S.) Penna. Law
Review, (American Law Register) pp. 400-402, wherein it is con-
tended that the statute should, by analogy to an auxiliary bill in
equity for the discovery of documents, afford production and in-
spection before trial.
A recent decision of the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Western District of Missouri, Rosenberger v. Shubert, et al., 182
Fed. 411, (I9Io), also holds that the Statute may afford production
in advance of trial.
(643)
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The principal case also decides another very important point,
viz. :-that under the same Statute there must exist a necessity for
the production of the document, "by reason of the mover's inability
to secure the necessary information from any other source * * * for
the preparation of the case for trial."
Is this a correct interpretation of the R. S., Sec. 724, Statute
which authorizes the Court to order production of documents "which
contain evidence pertinent to the issue in cases and under circum-
stances where they might be compelled to produce the same by or-
dinary rules of proceeding in Chancery"?
Merwin's Equity, p. 477, asserts exactly the contrary of the
above case, the author remarking: "Discovery will not be refused
because the same facts can be proved by other testimony, but dis-
covery will be granted in order to confirm or even to dispense with
such other proofs."
In Story's Equity Pleading,. Sec. 324 (7th Ed.), it is said:
"It is not necessary to allege in the bill that the plaintiff has no
other witness or evidence to establish at law the facts of which the
discovery is sought; for he is entitled to it, if it be merely cumula-
tive evidence of material facts." Mr. Merwin points out that judge
Story was also a member of the Court which decided the case of
Brown v. Swan.1 It is on the supposed application of this Supreme
Court decision that the principal case was decided. The true mean-
ing of the case of Brown v. Swan will be considered later.
The principal case was an action at law on a quantum meruit
for professional legal services. The plaintiff had acted as the de-
fendant's counsel in a litigation which resulted in the acquisition by
his clients of the Shubert Theatre in Kansas City, Missouri. The
plaintiff moved for production before trial of two books of the de-
fendants, (i) the "weekly statement book" alleged to contain the
income and expenses of the said theatre and (2) the "pass-book"
containing deposits by the defendants in a particular bank, these
deposits having been derived only from the theatre's receipts.
"Plaintiff desires the information * * * for the purpose of
showing the amount in controversy in the former action and the
financial ability of the defendants to pay the fees sued for." (P.
412.)
The issue at law being, what is a reasonable fee for the plaintiff's
services, there can be.no doubt whatever that the evidence as to the
value of the property gained for the defendant through the plaint-
iff's successful services was material evidence, pertinent to that issue.
The question presented is therefore plainly this, whether a bill
in equity in aid of such an action 'would lie for the production of
these papers in the absence of any averment in the bill that the
papers were indispensable to prove the case at law of the plaintiff?
In Chancery the test of a plaintiff's right to inspect the defendant's
documents in such a case was not the indispensable nature of the
Iio Peers, 497.
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documents but whether the documents might have a tendency as
relevant evidence to prove the case of the plaintiff. If relevancy
existed, discovery was an absolute right. The Chancellor had no
discretion.
Vice Chancellor Wigram said in Earl of Glengall v. Frazer,
2 Hare R. 99, "The plaintiff is in this court entitled'to an answer
from the defendant, not only in respect of facts which he cannot
otherwise prove, but also as to facts the admission of which will
relieve him from the necessity of advancing proof from other
sources." See also Bureton v. Gamul, 2 Atk. 241 and Finch v.
Finch, 2 Ves. 492, Lord Hardwicke lays down the chancery prac-
tice as being "that every plaintiff is entitled to have a discovery from
defendants to enable him to ascertain facts material to the merits
of his case either because he cannot prove or in aid of proof; for a
man may be entitled to an answer of what he can prove to avoid
expense."
Hill, D. J.,2 most nearly strikes the proceedings in chancery
when using the following language "The motion should describe the
books or papers with as much certainty as may be and should fur-
ther state, that, according to the mover's knowledge or information
and belief, the books or papers called for will tend to prove the
issue in favor of the mover."
In many .cases, no doubt, the moving party has alleged a neces-
sity for the production of the papers but the averment went beyond
the pleading required.8
Judge Wallace, said: "It is a rule of the English Courts that
a party may maintain a bill of discovery in equity not only when he
is destitute of other evidence than the oath of the adverse party, to
establish his case, but also to aid such evidence or render it un-
necessary." -
Wigram, V. C., said: "He must show that it isI or may be
evidence which may prove or lead to or assist in proving his case
at the hearing of the suit." '
Obviously the attempt to exercise discretion where relevancy
is admitted introduces this absurdity, that the Chancellor must under-
take to predict in advance of trial how convincing the plaintiff's
evidence will be to a jury without the corroboration of the docu-
ments' sought.
The fundamental principle which justifies the production of
documents in a bill for documentary discovery, is that the defendant
admits by his answer that he has documents in his possession which
relate to the plaintiff's case. Unless this admission can be obtained
'Lowenstein v. Carey, 12 Fed. 943 (1882, N. D. Miss.).
United States v. Young, io Benedict (1879, So. D. N. Y.), under Sec-
tion 724; United States v. Hutton, io Idem, 268 (897) ; Bloede v. Bancroft,98 Fed. 175 (0899).
"Colgate v. Compaigne Francaise Co., 23 Blatchf. 84 (i885).
'Atty. General v. Thompson, 8 Hare, io6 (1849).
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from the defendant's answer no production was ordered.. Hence no
injustice could be done.
This equitable doctrine of documentary discovery is based upon
the principle that trials are thereby made more expeditious and
justice cheaper if the plaintiff can obtain from the defendant the
proof of facts which otherwise the plaintiff could prove, but could
prove only at perhaps a greater expense than by the bill for discovery.
Judge Story clearly explains the true meaning of Brown v.
Swan in his Equity Pleading, supra.
"It would be otherwise if the bill should not only ask dis-
covery but should ask relief in equity, for in the latter case the
bill would seek to withdraw the whole jurisdiction from the proper
court of law and to give it to the Court of Equity."
G.P.A.
CIVIL LIABILITY OF SOLDIERS OBEYING COMMANDS OF SUPERIOR
OFFICERS.-The question which this note is intended to raise is this:
Can a solider absolve himself from civil liability for his acts by
showing that he was acting in obedience to the command of his
superior officer. It is beyond doubt a good defence for acts done
in time of war on the field of battle or in the direct conduct of the
war itself.' Equally true it is not a defence in times of absolute
peace and quiet when no disturbance threatens the peace of the com-
munity. In war the will of the commanding officer is the law, and the
civil law, is suspended for the time being The existence of a
system of law implies power to compel obedience, and as the courts
of civil law cannot enforce their decrees in time of -war, the civil law,
as law, must of necessity cease to be the law of the land at that time.
But martial law is a law of necessity,2 and When the necessity for it
ceases the civil law becomes again the supreme law of the land. In
ordinary times of peace the civil is always above the military law.3
,-Any other rule would exempt the militia from obedience to the
will of the people as expressed by their legislature, and render the
.civil rights of all citizens- open to the despotic control of the com-
manding officer of the district.
The question arises, is there not some intermediate state when
the country is not at war, in the proper sense, and yet is not in a
state of peace and quiet? There are frequent periods in all states
when the civil authorities are powerless to quell disturbances, and
the strong hand of the military must be called upon to re-establish
order. It is just at this point that the conflict arises in the cases;
some holding that peace still reigns and that where there is peace
'Birkhimer Military Government, 448.
'it re Ezeta, 62 Fed. 972; Diekelman v. U. S., 92 U. S. 520; Com. v.
Shortall, 26 Pa. 165.
• Com. v. Small, 26 Pa. 31.
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the commands of a superior officer are no excuse; others holding that
a condition so like war exists that martial law prevails until peace
and security is restored.
The three divisions of military jurisdiction under the constitu-
tion were stated by Chief Justice Chase.4
The first is a jurisdiction under military law. This exists both
in times of peace and times of war, and is founded on express
statutory enactment prescribing regulations and rules for the internal
government and regulation of the land and naval forces of a country.
This does not suspend or supersede in any way, the civil law. The
soldier still retains the duties and liabilities of a civilian and may
be tried for any offence of which the civil courts have jurisdiction.5
The civil law has a concurrent jurisdiction which is supreme to
military law even on the military reservations. Thus the mere
fact that a person killing another was sergeant of the guard at
a fort and the person killed was a private soldier, does not of itself
make the killing a lawful homicide, nor give to a military tribunal
an exclusive jurisdiction of the case.' So also if a sentinel stationed
at the gate of a fort should wantonly shoot a civilian endeavoring to
enter in the daytime; or an officer should wilfully slay a soldier for
misconduct, the civil law court would have a complete jurisdiction
ovei the offences. The mere fact that the parties were soldiers
would not give them immunity from civil proceedings for so gross
an outrage.'
The second class of military jurisdiction consists in a military
government in the seat of war without the boundaries of the United
States, and applies only to cases of actual war.
The third is martial law proper and is to be exercised within
the limits of the United States in time of invasion or insurrection
or during rebellion within the limits of the States maintaining ad-
hesion to the National Government, when the public danger requires
its exercise, and within districts or localities where ordinary law no
longer adequately secures public safety and public rights. It would
seem from this that Chase thought that martial law would exist
even in times of general peace when public safety and security made
its exercise necessary. Nothing can be found in the opinion of the
majority in ex parte Milligan 5 that is contra to this. The decision
was based on the fact that there was no necessity for the exercise of
martial law in Indiana at that time, there being no rioting, and the
courts of the civil law being open for the just trial of criminals and
redress of grievances.
The author of an interesting article on the case of Private
Wadsworth,8 states that ex parte Milligan ought to estabilsh the
4 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, dissenting.
Franks v. Smith, 134 S. W. 484.
SUnited States v. Carr, Fed. Cas. 14,732.
United States v. Clarke, 31 Fed. 710.
51 Univ. of Penna. Law Review 87, Owen J. Roberts, Esq.
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proposition that martial law is not possible under the Constitution,
but it is very difficult to see how he reaches this 6onclusion. The
case seems plainly to rest only on a matter of fact, the lack of
necessity for the existence of martial law in Indiana at that time.
In Pennsylvania, at least, it is clear that in times of riot, when
the civil authorities no longer can control the situation, martial law
may exist.9  -
The national guard were called into service by the Governor to
quell rioting in the coal regions. A private militia-man, acting fully
within the orders of his commanding officer, shot and killed a
civilian whom, it afterwards appeared, was innocent of unlawful in-
tent but who was acting, at .the time, under circumstances making
a contrary belief reasonable. Upon a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus, after arrest by the authorities, the Supreme Court said:
"It is not unfrequently said that the community must be either in
a state of war or of peace, as there is no intermediate state. But
from the point of view now under consideration this is an error.
There may be peace for all ordinary purposes of life and yet a state
of disorder, violence and danger in special directions, which though
not technically war, has in its limited field the same effect, and if
important enough to call for martial laN for suppression, is not
distinguishable, so far as the powers of tfie commanding officers
are concerned, from actual war. It was pointed out that many au-
thorities hold that martial law exists wherever the military arm of
the government is called into service to suppress disorder and restore
the public peace. The sheriff, as the highest executive officer of the
country, may retain the command; and it he does so, ordinarily the
military must act in subordination to him. But if the situation goes
beyond county control, and requires the full power of the state,
the Governor intervenes as the supreme executive and he or his
military representative becomes the superior and commanding officer.
"The effect of martial law is to put into operation the powers
and methods vested in the commanding officer by military law. So
far as his powers for the preservation of order and security of life
and property are concerned there is no limit but the necessities and
exigencies of the situation. And in this respect there is no differ-
ence between a public war and a domestic insurrection. What has
been called the paramount law of self defence, common to all
countries, has established the rule that whatever force is necessary
is also lawful." ' "This law, (i. e., the law of self defence) applied
nationally, is the martial law, which is an offshoot of the common
law, and, although ordinarily dormant in peace, may be called forth
by insurrection and in invasion." 10
It is argued against the existence of martial law that it would
make an end of free government, and make life, liberty, and property
subject to the will of the commanding officer. Civil liberty and
'Com., ex tel., Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165.
"H_-ale Am. Const. Law, 924.
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martial law cannot endure together, and in the conflict one or the
other must perish.". Martial law destroys every guarantee of the
Constitution, and effectually renders the military independent of and
superior to the civil power. The answer is .that martial law is a law
of necessity 12 and no more deprives a citizen of a constitutional right
than the dynamiting of buildings in a burning city to save the un-
burned portions from total destruction. If the officers act in excess
of the necessity they are liable civilly and criminally for such ex-
cess.'3 The safeguards against martial law are not found in the
denial of its protection, but in the amenability of the president to im-
peachment, of military officers to the civil and criminal laws and to
military law; in the frequent change of public officers, and the de-
pendence of the army on the pleasure of the legislature.'
4
The ultimate determination of the validitj of the defence of com-
mand 6f a superior officer depends whether the jurisdiction in which
it is pleaded, recognizes the existence of martial law in times of riot
and disturbance, when the soldiers are called into active service to
re-establish order. The recent case of Frank v. Smith ' distinctly
repudiates the theory that martial law can exist except when actual
war is being waged, and holds that the orders which a soldier may
obey with impunity from civil liability are confined to such as a peace
officer in this discharge of his duty might execute. This court recog-
nized the difficult position of a soldier who may be liable to be shot
for disobedience of orders, or be hanged by a judge and a jury if
he obeys them, and suggests that the soldier's embarrassing position
will be ameliorated by holding that his liability is that of a peace
officer. But unfortunately the soldier's position remains almost
equally serious, for he is still liable to be shot for disobedience to
orders, while to give him the rights of a civil officer will not meet
the range his superior's commands may take..
A better rule, giving protection to the soldier and to the civilian
alike, is laid down in a number of cases: "Unless the act were
manifestly beyond the scope of the soldier's authority, or were such
that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know that
it was illegal and it would be a protection to him if he acted in
good faith and without malice." "In such cases justice to the
subordinate demands, and the necessities and efficiency of the pub-
lic service require, that the orders of the superior should protect
the inferior, leaving the responsibility to rest where it properly be-
longs, upon the offic~r who gave the command."
- To the same effect is the case of U. S. v. Carr,
1 and in Riggs v.
" ln re Egan, 5 Blatchf. 319; Franks v. Smith, supra.
"In re Ezeta, supra; Diekelman v. U. S., II Ct. Claims, 417; Carver v.
U. S., 16 Ct. Claims, 361; Birkhimer, Mil. Govt. 9.
Birkhimer, Mil. Govt. 314.
" Idem. 3o6.
3134 S. W. 484 (Ky. 1911).
"McCall v. McDowell, I Abb. (U. S.) 22.
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State,17 it was stated that any order given by an officer to his private
which does not expressly and clearly show on its face, or in the
body thereof, its own legality, the soldier would be bound to obey,
and such orders would be a protection to him. "A soldier, con-
sequently, runs little risk in obeying any order which a man of
common sense so placed would regard as warranted by the circum-
stances. 8
G. H. C.
27 4 Cold. 85.
"Hare. Const. Law, 92o.
